Tag: Supported

Single Judge Application; reason and bases; Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001); failure discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant; Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994); the Board cannot “evade [its] statutory responsibility [to state the reasons or bases for its conclusions] merely by adopting [a medical opinion] as its own” where the medical opinion “fails to discuss all the evidence which appears to support [the] appellant’s position.” Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994). Gabrielson does not require that a medical opinion discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant, only that the Board, in relying on an opinion that does not do so, discuss any additional favorable evidence to comply with its duty to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its decision. See id.; 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); see also Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001) (holding that, although the Board must consider all of the evidence of record, “a discussion of all evidence is not required when . . . the Board has supported its decision with thorough reasons or bases regarding the relevant evidence”);
Single Judge Application; Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 109 (2017); “entitlement to a separate evaluation in a given case depends on whether the manifestations of disability for which a separate evaluation is being sought have already been compensated by an assigned evaluation under a different DC.” Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 109 (2017). Further, a veteran with a musculoskeletal disability, such as Mr. Wilson’s left knee disability, may be entitled to a higher disability evaluation than that supported by mechanical application of the schedule where there is evidence that the disability causes “additional functional loss—i.e., ‘the inability . . . to perform the normal working movements of the body with normal excursion, strength, speed, coordination[,] and endurance’— including as due to pain and/or other factors” or “reduction of a joint’s normal excursion of movement in different planes, including changes in the joint’s range of movement, strength, fatigability, or coordination.” Id. at 117-18 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 and citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.45); see Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 26, 32 (2017) (“Flare-ups . . . must be factored into an examiner’s assessment of functional loss”); Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 32, 36-37 (2011); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 202, 205-07(1995).;

Single Judge Application; Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 109 (2017); “entitlement to a separate evaluation in a given case depends on whether the manifestations of disability for which a separate evaluation is being sought have already been compensated by an assigned evaluation under a different DC.” Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 109 (2017). Further, a veteran with a musculoskeletal disability, such as Mr. Wilson’s left knee disability, may be entitled to a higher disability evaluation than that supported by mechanical application of the schedule where there is evidence that the disability causes “additional functional loss—i.e., ‘the inability . . . to perform the normal working movements of the body with normal excursion, strength, speed, coordination[,] and endurance’— including as due to pain and/or other factors” or “reduction of a joint’s normal excursion of movement in different planes, including changes in the joint’s range of movement, strength, fatigability, or coordination.” Id. at 117-18 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 and citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.45); see Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 26, 32 (2017) (“Flare-ups . . . must be factored into an examiner’s assessment of functional loss”); Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 32, 36-37 (2011); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 202, 205-07(1995).;

Single Judge Application; Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 109 (2017); “entitlement to a separate evaluation in a given case depends on whether the manifestations of disability for which ...

Single Judge Application; Wise v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 517, 531 (2014); apply the correct standard of proof for determining that issue; The examiner rejected the scientific evidence because it did not definitely establish a causal link as a generally accepted principle. However, “Congress has not mandated that a medical principle have reached the level of scientific consensus to support a claim for VA benefits.” Wise v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 517, 531 (2014). Although the examiner rejected the scientific research evidence, “this did not relieve the Board of its obligation to consider and discuss the potentially favorable medical literature of record” that supported Mr. Lardinois’s theory of service connection and “to apply the correct standard of proof for determining that issue.” Id. at 531-32; see R. at 353-37 (scientific literature submitted by Mr. Lardinois). However, the Board did not discuss the scientific research evidence submitted by Mr. Lardinois; instead, it adopted the examiner’s opinion and his rejection of the scientific evidence without addressing or reconciling that opinion with the proper adjudicative standard of proof; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA