Tag: Fed

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 RO decision. Specifically, he contends that Wagner is an authoritative statement of what section 311 meant at the time of the 1981 RO decision. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6. The Court agrees with the appellant that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 1111 in Wagner is an authoritative statement of what that statute has meant since the date of enactment in 1958. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d at 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We made clear . . . , that ‘[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, our interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.’” (quoting Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(remanding for further consideration of CUE request using the correct standard articulated in Wagner and directing remand to Board, if necessary, to determine whether the Secretary has rebutted the presumption of soundness by providing clear and unmistakable evidence that the presumption has been rebutted))); see also Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the appellant’s CUE request challenges the validity of a regulation but does not question the correct legal standard under the statute, and that “Wagner governs that issue”). Thus, the Court agrees with the appellant that the Board erred when it concluded that he could not challenge the correct legal standard that applies under section 1111 in the CUE context.;

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 RO decision. Specifically, he contends that Wagner is an authoritative statement of what section 311 meant at the time of the 1981 RO decision. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6. The Court agrees with the appellant that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 1111 in Wagner is an authoritative statement of what that statute has meant since the date of enactment in 1958. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d at 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We made clear . . . , that ‘[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, our interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.’” (quoting Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(remanding for further consideration of CUE request using the correct standard articulated in Wagner and directing remand to Board, if necessary, to determine whether the Secretary has rebutted the presumption of soundness by providing clear and unmistakable evidence that the presumption has been rebutted))); see also Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the appellant’s CUE request challenges the validity of a regulation but does not question the correct legal standard under the statute, and that “Wagner governs that issue”). Thus, the Court agrees with the appellant that the Board erred when it concluded that he could not challenge the correct legal standard that applies under section 1111 in the CUE context.;

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 ...

Single Judge Application; Geib, 733 F.3d at 1354 (establishing that “applicable regulations place responsibility for the ultimate TDIU determination on the VA, not a medical examiner”); Board was therefore prohibited from characterizing their silence on the issue as substantive evidence against entitlement to TDIU; AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that “where a condition would not normally have been recorded, the Board may not consider the absence of [administrative record] evidence as substantive negative evidence of that condition.”); “[T]he absence of evidence on a particular question cannot be construed as negative evidence against a claimant unless there is a foundation in the record that demonstrates that such silence has a tendency to prove or disprove a relevant fact.” Delrio, 32 Vet.App. at 240 (citing Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015));
FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses the same “arbitrary, capricious” language; we have used APA jurisprudence in applying the Title 38 provision. See Euzebio v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The Veterans Court must also review Board and VA determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘arbitrary [and] capricious’ decision making, including whether the Board or VA[] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem . . . .” (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A) and State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43)); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 432 n.2 (2011) (“[T]he Veterans Court’s scope of review, § 7261, is similar to that of an Article III court reviewing agency action under the [APA] . . . .”); Whether an agency has failed to address an important aspect of a problem, and is arbitrary and capricious for that reason, can turn on the specific statutes and regulations that govern the agency, see Oregon Natural Re-sources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.1996), but that does not distinguish 38 U.S.C. § 7261 from 5 U.S.C. § 706;

FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses the same “arbitrary, capricious” language; we have used APA jurisprudence in applying the Title 38 provision. See Euzebio v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The Veterans Court must also review Board and VA determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘arbitrary [and] capricious’ decision making, including whether the Board or VA[] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem . . . .” (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A) and State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43)); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 432 n.2 (2011) (“[T]he Veterans Court’s scope of review, § 7261, is similar to that of an Article III court reviewing agency action under the [APA] . . . .”); Whether an agency has failed to address an important aspect of a problem, and is arbitrary and capricious for that reason, can turn on the specific statutes and regulations that govern the agency, see Oregon Natural Re-sources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.1996), but that does not distinguish 38 U.S.C. § 7261 from 5 U.S.C. § 706;

FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses ...

Decision Assessment Document; Shea v. Wilkie, June 20, 2019, 926 F. 3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019); where claimant’s filings refer to specific medical records, and those records contain a reasonable ascertainable diagnosis of a disability, the claimant has raised an informal claim for that disability under 38 C.F.R. 3.155(a);
(1) is in writing; (2) indicates an intent to apply for veterans’ benefits; and (3) identifies the particular benefits sought.” Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “[v]eteran need not refer explicitly to the name of an illness, injury, or condition” on his claim form. Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1335 (Fed.Cir. 2020). A high level of generality will suffice, so long as the “benefit sought . . . can also be found indirectly through examination of evidence to which those documents themselves point when sympathetically read.” Shea, 926 F.3d at 1368 (internal quotation marks omitted).; Had Mr. Germany’s mental health records been before the RO in the first instance in evaluating his Claim, that might have been sufficient to qualify as an informal claim. See id. at 1370. In Shea, we held that the VA erred by not construing the veteran’s claim to cover psychiatric conditions referenced in her medical records but not explicitly listed on her claim form. Id; 2 In 2015, the VA implemented a rule that claims for disability benefits must be filed on a standard form and revised 38 C.F.R. § 3.155. See Standard Claims and Appeals Forms, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,660 (Sept. 25, 2014).
Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in the claim-stating documents, but can also be found indirectly through examination of evidence to which those documents themselves point when sympathetically read.” Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, the claim-stating documents pointed, when sympathetically viewed, to a history of symptoms of abdominal pain that yielded a diagnosis of gastritis. And that’s not all. The veteran’s gastritis was expressly linked to service by VA’s own medical examiner—in the context of an examination sought by the Agency as part of the development of Mr. Martinelli’s other claims.; The Secretary says the veteran is out of his depth in suggesting to the Court that melatonin use indicates sleep issues. But even if that were true, the veteran retorts, the Secretary forgets the Court’s ability to take judicial notice of facts generally known. See Tagupa v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 95, 100-01 (2014). Indeed, one need look no further than a basic medical dictionary to conclude that his in-service prescription was favorable, material evidence. Melatonin is “a hormone . . . implicated in the regulation of sleep, mood, puberty, and ovarian cycles. It has been tried therapeutically for a number of conditions, including insomnia and jet lag.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1110 (33d ed. 2020). The Board has a responsibility to explain why it rejects favorable, material evidence. Garner v. Tran, 33 Vet.App. 241, 250 (2021).;

Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in the claim-stating documents, but can also be found indirectly through examination of evidence to which those documents themselves point when sympathetically read.” Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, the claim-stating documents pointed, when sympathetically viewed, to a history of symptoms of abdominal pain that yielded a diagnosis of gastritis. And that’s not all. The veteran’s gastritis was expressly linked to service by VA’s own medical examiner—in the context of an examination sought by the Agency as part of the development of Mr. Martinelli’s other claims.; The Secretary says the veteran is out of his depth in suggesting to the Court that melatonin use indicates sleep issues. But even if that were true, the veteran retorts, the Secretary forgets the Court’s ability to take judicial notice of facts generally known. See Tagupa v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 95, 100-01 (2014). Indeed, one need look no further than a basic medical dictionary to conclude that his in-service prescription was favorable, material evidence. Melatonin is “a hormone . . . implicated in the regulation of sleep, mood, puberty, and ovarian cycles. It has been tried therapeutically for a number of conditions, including insomnia and jet lag.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1110 (33d ed. 2020). The Board has a responsibility to explain why it rejects favorable, material evidence. Garner v. Tran, 33 Vet.App. 241, 250 (2021).;

Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in ...

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed in processing that claim; claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim; The Board did not, however, address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran’s specific claim for tinnitus encompassed a claim for a vestibular condition manifesting in dizziness, as required by Clemons. In Clemons, the Court explained that, because lay claimants generally lack the medical knowledge to narrow the universe of a claim to a particular diagnosis, VA “should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth,” and factors relevant to that inquiry include “the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board may not deny a claim because a lay claimant’s hypothesized diagnosis proves incorrect; rather, the Board must “confront[] the difficult questions of what current []condition actually exist[s] and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service.” Id. at 6. In so doing, the Board must make “affirmative finding[s] as to the nature of the [claimant’s] condition.” Id. In short, “the fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Id.; see generally Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim”).;

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed in processing that claim; claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim; The Board did not, however, address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran’s specific claim for tinnitus encompassed a claim for a vestibular condition manifesting in dizziness, as required by Clemons. In Clemons, the Court explained that, because lay claimants generally lack the medical knowledge to narrow the universe of a claim to a particular diagnosis, VA “should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth,” and factors relevant to that inquiry include “the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board may not deny a claim because a lay claimant’s hypothesized diagnosis proves incorrect; rather, the Board must “confront[] the difficult questions of what current []condition actually exist[s] and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service.” Id. at 6. In so doing, the Board must make “affirmative finding[s] as to the nature of the [claimant’s] condition.” Id. In short, “the fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Id.; see generally Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim”).;

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed ...

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if ...

“[P]rivate medical evidence since the initial exam that indicates the veteran’s medical history [] include[s] cold injury residuals [is] based upon his verbal history—not the evidence of record.” R. at 3583. There is no doubt that the RO’s distinction between the “evidence of record” and the veteran’s own statements was completely misleading at best. See 38 U.S.C.§ 5107(b) (requiring the Secretary to “consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case”); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that VA is required to give due consideration to all pertinent medical and lay evidence in evaluating a claim to disability or death benefits); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that””lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered, if submitted, when a veteran’s claim seeks disability benefits” and holding that, in certain situations, “competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself” to establish entitlement to such benefits). The language used in the request indicates that the veteran’s own statements are not “evidence of record” and would require at least corroboration in service medical records to be credible and probative. That is contrary to Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1335 (finding improper the Board’s determination that ‘lay statements lacked credibility merely because they were not corroborated by contemporaneous [SMRs]”).; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

“[P]rivate medical evidence since the initial exam that indicates the veteran’s medical history [] include[s] cold injury residuals [is] based upon his verbal history—not the evidence of record.” R. at 3583. There is no doubt that the RO’s distinction between the “evidence of record” and the veteran’s own statements was completely misleading at best. See 38 U.S.C.§ 5107(b) (requiring the Secretary to “consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case”); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that VA is required to give due consideration to all pertinent medical and lay evidence in evaluating a claim to disability or death benefits); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that””lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered, if submitted, when a veteran’s claim seeks disability benefits” and holding that, in certain situations, “competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself” to establish entitlement to such benefits). The language used in the request indicates that the veteran’s own statements are not “evidence of record” and would require at least corroboration in service medical records to be credible and probative. That is contrary to Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1335 (finding improper the Board’s determination that ‘lay statements lacked credibility merely because they were not corroborated by contemporaneous [SMRs]”).; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

Single Judge Application; Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009); The RO’s request distinguished between the veteran’s statements and the other evidence of record: “rivate medical ...

Single Judge Application; George v. McDonough, 991 F.3d 1227, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 2021) confirming that the law as it was understood at the time did not require VA to rebut the presumption of sound condition with clear and unmistakable evidence that the condition was not aggravated by service; 1970 presumption of sound condition; In 1970, VA’s implementing regulation did not require clear and unmistakable evidence of lack of aggravation by service for rebuttal. See 38 C.F.R. §3.304(b) (1970); Instead, if the presumption of sound condition applied, the burden fell on VA to rebut the presumption with clear and unmistakable evidence that an injury or disease that manifested in service preexisted service. See George, 991 F.3d at 1229-30 (noting that VA’s 1970 version of the regulation, permitting VA to rebut the presumption of soundness with only clear and unmistakable evidence that the disorder preexisted service, prevailed until 2003); 38 U.S.C. § 311 (1970) (current version § 1111); » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
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