Tag: cases

Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less than ten levels of disability for most of the conditions listed in the schedule. See generally 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.71a – 4.150 (1992). Therefore, the schedular ratings established by the Secretary for compensation purposes may not in all cases provide a sufficiently comprehensive basis for determining when a measured worsening of a particular veteran’s condition in service constitutes an “increase in disability” for purposes of establishing service connection through aggravation under section 1153. This would seem to be so where the next higher rating is more than one decile greater. Furthermore, the rating-schedule provisions may not in all cases provide the most accurate or most logical basis for determining whether there has been an “increase in disability” during service. For example, with respect to organic mental disorders and psychoneurotic disorders, the rating schedule provides for disability ratings based on a finding that the condition causes “total”, “severe”, “considerable”, “definite”, or “mild” social and industrial impairment. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Codes 9300-9411 (1992);

Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less than ten levels of disability for most of the conditions listed in the schedule. See generally 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.71a – 4.150 (1992). Therefore, the schedular ratings established by the Secretary for compensation purposes may not in all cases provide a sufficiently comprehensive basis for determining when a measured worsening of a particular veteran’s condition in service constitutes an “increase in disability” for purposes of establishing service connection through aggravation under section 1153. This would seem to be so where the next higher rating is more than one decile greater. Furthermore, the rating-schedule provisions may not in all cases provide the most accurate or most logical basis for determining whether there has been an “increase in disability” during service. For example, with respect to organic mental disorders and psychoneurotic disorders, the rating schedule provides for disability ratings based on a finding that the condition causes “total”, “severe”, “considerable”, “definite”, or “mild” social and industrial impairment. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Codes 9300-9411 (1992);

Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less ...

Hall v. McDonough, No. 19-8717 (Decided October 18, 2021); The particular form a claimant submits—correct or otherwise—has no bearing on the Board’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Although VA can require a claimant to fill out a particular form and can dismiss nonconforming or untimely filings in appropriate circumstances, none of this affects the Board’s jurisdiction to hear appeals of veterans benefits decisions. Only Congress (or the Constitution) can set the parameters for jurisdiction, so an agency can neither expand nor limit its own jurisdiction through regulation. And because there is no indication that Congress intended to limit the Board’s jurisdiction to cases where veterans fill out the correct form, we reverse the Board’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction and remand for further development.;
Single Judge Application; obesity; Walsh v. Wilkie; Gen. Coun. Prec. 1-2017 (Jan. 6, 2017); A 2017 VA General Counsel (VAGC) precedent opinion determined that “[o]besity may be an ‘intermediate step’ between a service-connected disability and a current disability that may be service connected on a secondary basis under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a),” VA Gen. Coun. Prec. 1-2017 (Jan. 6, 2017), at 2, ¶ 5. The VAGC explained that, in these cases, the Board would be required to resolve (1) whether the service-connected disability caused the veteran to become obese; (2) if so, whether obesity as a result of the service-connected disability was a substantial factor in causing the claimed secondary disability; and (3) whether the claimed secondary disability would not have occurred but for obesity caused by the service-connected disability. Id. at 9-10, ¶ 15. See also Walsh v. Wilkie, Vet.App., 2020 WL 878798 (Feb. 24, 2020) at *5 (holding that G.C. Prec. 1-2017 requires the Board to consider aggravation in the context of these claims when the theory is explicitly raised by the veteran or reasonably raised by the record).;
Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in the claim-stating documents, but can also be found indirectly through examination of evidence to which those documents themselves point when sympathetically read.” Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, the claim-stating documents pointed, when sympathetically viewed, to a history of symptoms of abdominal pain that yielded a diagnosis of gastritis. And that’s not all. The veteran’s gastritis was expressly linked to service by VA’s own medical examiner—in the context of an examination sought by the Agency as part of the development of Mr. Martinelli’s other claims.; The Secretary says the veteran is out of his depth in suggesting to the Court that melatonin use indicates sleep issues. But even if that were true, the veteran retorts, the Secretary forgets the Court’s ability to take judicial notice of facts generally known. See Tagupa v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 95, 100-01 (2014). Indeed, one need look no further than a basic medical dictionary to conclude that his in-service prescription was favorable, material evidence. Melatonin is “a hormone . . . implicated in the regulation of sleep, mood, puberty, and ovarian cycles. It has been tried therapeutically for a number of conditions, including insomnia and jet lag.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1110 (33d ed. 2020). The Board has a responsibility to explain why it rejects favorable, material evidence. Garner v. Tran, 33 Vet.App. 241, 250 (2021).;

Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in the claim-stating documents, but can also be found indirectly through examination of evidence to which those documents themselves point when sympathetically read.” Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, the claim-stating documents pointed, when sympathetically viewed, to a history of symptoms of abdominal pain that yielded a diagnosis of gastritis. And that’s not all. The veteran’s gastritis was expressly linked to service by VA’s own medical examiner—in the context of an examination sought by the Agency as part of the development of Mr. Martinelli’s other claims.; The Secretary says the veteran is out of his depth in suggesting to the Court that melatonin use indicates sleep issues. But even if that were true, the veteran retorts, the Secretary forgets the Court’s ability to take judicial notice of facts generally known. See Tagupa v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 95, 100-01 (2014). Indeed, one need look no further than a basic medical dictionary to conclude that his in-service prescription was favorable, material evidence. Melatonin is “a hormone . . . implicated in the regulation of sleep, mood, puberty, and ovarian cycles. It has been tried therapeutically for a number of conditions, including insomnia and jet lag.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1110 (33d ed. 2020). The Board has a responsibility to explain why it rejects favorable, material evidence. Garner v. Tran, 33 Vet.App. 241, 250 (2021).;

Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in ...

Single Judge Application; failure define term or degree; Mr. Thornton cites Johnson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 245, 255 (2018), arguing that the Board must disclose the standard under which it is operating. Appellant’s Br. at 26. But Johnson focused on a situation where the Board failed to define a term of degree (specifically, “very frequent”) that could be applied inconsistently across similar cases without a clear definition. 30 Vet.App. at 255;
Page 1 of 2 1 2